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The purpose of this project is to increase our knowledge about trade-offs between productivity and 
labour market participation across the OECD, and more specifically in the European Union. The 
inquiry is focused around the question whether there is a trade-off between labour participation and 
productivity and, if so, how big it is and how long does it last. In particular, through a series of panel 
regressions we isolate the structural or long-term relationships, as well as identify how long the “long-
term” is. We also investigate the extent to which the trade-offs can be associated with particular types 
of workers (in terms of age or gender). Our main findings are, firstly, that the negative productivity 
response elasticity to a 1% rise in participation (measured as the employment rate) is less than 0.3 and 
peters out in less than 5 years. Secondly, increased participation is the key factor related to this 
productivity growth tradeoff. We find little effect of hours per worker on productivity. Thirdly, female 
participation has the strongest negative impact on productivity growth, but it is associated with 
specific age and/or cohort effects that are likely to diminish in the longer run. Finally, we investigate 
simple scenarios to look at the effect of increases in participation on productivity and per capita 
income, showing the large potential for income gains without much loss in productivity. 
                                                     
∗ Acknowledgments: this study was done with a grant received from the Netherlands Ministry of Economics Affairs. The 
authors are grateful to Lourens Broersma, Hedwig Duteweerd, Johanneke Henstra, Matt Spiegelman, Edwin Stuivenwold, 
and especially Toni Spera, for research assistance and advice. 
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1.1 The main questions 
In recent years, a fair amount of research has been done on the causes of the productivity revival in 
the U.S. and the slowdown in productivity growth in the EU.1 The role of investment in physical and 
human capital has been widely addressed, in particular the role of ICT investment and complementary 
increases in the skill level of workers. There has been substantial attention to the role of innovation 
and R&D, the functioning of capital, labour and product markets, and sound macroeconomic policies. 
 
A major question looming in the background has been to what extent increases in labour force 
participation may affect productivity advances negatively. This question is of particular relevance for 
many European countries which have realized large gains in labour participation since the mid-1990s. 
These increases in participation might, for example, imply that European countries have put most of 
the instruments for growth in place but that, for example, through bringing more low-skilled people 
into the labour force, they are – at least for the time being – seeing some offsetting productivity 
losses.  
 
There are a number of specific more detailed questions that need to be answered before 
jumping to the conclusion that participation-productivity trade-offs are a given fact of life. How 
should we exactly understand this trade-off between productivity and participation growth and what 
are the compensating adjustments? In a world where training, education and on the job learning 
improves worker skills is it credible to argue that increased participation has lasting negative effects 
on productivity? How does the effect of a rise in the employment rate relate to an increase in hours 
per person? What is the role of age and gender cohorts in this trade-off? Is it the U.S. or is it Europe 
that is the exception to the rule? And are the 1990s – the period during which many European 
countries showed a significant increase in participation and declining productivity growth – the result 
of factors other than the increased participation? Finally, what are the effects on per capita income? In 
this study we aim to deal with these questions on the relationship between labour participation and 
labour productivity. 
 
1.2 Our approach 
Although the basic question posed above is from the perspective of relative levels of productivity, we 
set up our analysis from the perspective of analyzing the impact of an increase in participation on 
productivity growth. We approach the problem by looking directly at productivity tradeoff 
regressions, and examine how the pattern of the observed trade-offs develop when the measurement 
interval for productivity growth is lengthened from annual to 10-year time spans. We also make a 
distinction between age and gender categories to measure the impact of these subcategories using the 
same basic modeling structure. This approach is supplemented by a simple but complementary set of 
regressions based on cross-section levels regressions. These cross-section or point-in-time regressions 
allow us to focus on productivity levels in relation to participation rates at various points in time. 
  
                                                     
1 See OECD (2003) and O’Mahony and van Ark (2003) for the most recent evidence. 
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1.3 Main findings 
In a nutshell the key finding of this study is that there is a clear trade-off between the increase in the 
overall employment rate (i.e., the employment/populatoin ratio) and the rise in productivity in the 
short-run. The precise length of time of the short-run varies by country and is conditional on the 
flexibility of markets within the country and the nature and source of the adjustments in participation 
rates. But, for our sample of countries and available data the short-run is less than 5 years and the 
productivity response elasticity to changes in the employment rate is far less than 1.0, that is, less than 
0.3.  
 
We were not able to identify a sensible coefficient on the impact of a rise in hours worked per 
person employed to productivity growth. The main reason for this is that working hours strongly 
interact with per capita income growth, reflecting a rise in living standards, so that our panel 
regressions cannot distinguish that effect from a direct relationship to productivity, which is, of 
course, also highly correlated with per capita income (see Figure 1) . However, in our cross-section 
results we identified a small negative elasticity of working hours on productivity, consistently around 
0.04 relative to 0.2 to 0.3 for employment participation. 
 
When looking at the impact of age and gender, there appears to be only a small negative 
short-run impact associated with age. Older workers, especially females, have lower skill levels 
(measured by educational attainment) than younger workers. But younger workers are more 
inexperienced and require more time for learning and training. There is a substantially larger impact, 
however, associated with increased female participation. Much of this appears to be linked to age 
and/or cohort specific effects: increased participation of older women shows a relatively strong 
negative effect. Given the recent positive trends in educational attainment of females and greater 
equality between young females and males in most countries, the tradeoff is likely to be smaller in the 
future. 
 
It is very difficult to link cross-country comparisons of educational attainment into our 
analysis mainly because we lack information on the education characteristics of those who are not in 
the labour force. Looking at the levels of educational attainment of the existing labour force, however, 
there is a decisive decline in the share of workers in the labour force with lower skills; a trend which 
continued into the second half of the 1990s. 
 
These results have important implications for another key measure of economic performance, 
i.e. per capita income. The elasticity of GDP per capita with respect to changes in participation is 
positive for each time interval and increasing as the measured time interval increases. The main gain 
from increased labour force participation is therefore that GDP and per capita income continue to 
increase. How much of the potential increase is realized depends on whether labour productivity 





1.4 Outline of the report 
In the remainder of the report we will proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the basic relationships 
that lie behind our analysis, which is a decomposition of per capita income in labour productivity, 
labour participation and hours worked per person employed. We also discuss why we focus on 
participation measured by the employment rate (i.e., the employment/population ratio). Section 3 sets 
out our empirical specification. It includes a panel regression and a cross-section model, and describes 
the econometric issues involved. We also argue in some detail why one should be cautious in treating 
hours worked as an explanatory variable in the trade-off framework. Section 4 discusses the results of 
our statistical analysis on the basis of the aggregate participation indicators, and we compare our 
results with those from some earlier studies. Section 5 deals with gender and age groupings. Section 6 
describes some scenarios which are based on the regression results from our panel analysis. Section 7 
concludes and provides some key policy-related recommendations. 
 
 
2. A decomposition of per capita income into productivity and participation 
 
2.1 A simple decomposition 
The analysis in this study is centered on the relationship between productivity, the employment rate 
and hours per employee. These factors are the key determinants of per capita income, the most 
important and comprehensive measure of economic welfare. If one produces more output with the 
same labour input, there will be more output per capita. If the proportion of the population working 
increases while maintaining productivity growth, per capita income also increases. By definition per 
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where Y is GDP, P is population, H is total hours worked and E is total employed persons. 
This identity is very useful since it provides a way to examine the components of productivity over 
time for a particular country as well as a way to compare the contribution of the various components 
to per capita income between countries. 
 


















Y loglogloglog     (2) 
 
The change in the employment/population ratio (E/P, hereafter called the employment rate) 
can then be further broken down into the number of persons employed relative to the total labour 
force (E/L, which is the reciprocal of the unemployment rate), the ratio of the labour force to all 
persons in the working age population, aged 15 to 64 (L/P1564, the narrow labour force participation 
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1564 loglogloglog    (3) 
 
The aggregate participation rates given in Equation (3) can be further decomposed into 
individual participation rates by age, gender and skill level that reflect these components of the 
workforce. This has been an important additional step in this project compared to previous work. 
 
2.2 A first view of the data 
The decompositions of equations (1) and (2) are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 1 shows 
the decomposition in terms of levels relative to the U.S. in 2002, and Table 2 shows the composition 
in terms of growth rates for the most recent period in our sample, 1990-2002.2  
 
Our analysis is based on a large data set including 36 countries, which include all present 
OECD member states and some of the new member states of the EU which are not a member of 
OECD. This part of the database, which is obtained from the GGDC/TCB Total Economy Database 
(http://www.ggdc.net/dseries), includes measure of GDP, population, employment and working hours. 
We cover the period 1970-2002 (working with an unbalanced panel, because not all 36 countries are 
available for all years), and do a separate analysis for the most recent period 1990-2002 (working with 
a balanced panel for all 36 countries). For the purposes of this project, the TCB/GGDC database was 
supplemented with information on population and employment by age and gender from numerous 
sources mainly from OECD and Eurostat. Appendix 1 discusses in some detail the data variables, 
their sources, gaps in the data, strategies used to overcome gaps in the data and various estimation 
strategies. A second data annex (Appendix 2) provides tables showing the variables of interest by 
country and time period. 
 
On the basis of the measures in Tables 1 and 2 it appears that productivity and participation, 
irrespective of being measured broadly as the employment rate or more narrowly in terms of the 
labour force participation rate, tends to show a negative relationship to productivity. However, the 
relationship is certainly not perfect and other factors also play in role in determining this relationship. 
 
                                                     
2 See van Ark and McGuckin (1999) and McGuckin and van Ark (2004) for earlier versions and discussion of 
these tables. 
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Luxembourg 125.4 -21.0 104.5 0.4 33.5 1.1 139.5
Norway 121.2 -34.3 86.9 0.6 6.1 -2.1 91.4
Belgium 110.8 -17.2 93.6 -4.1 -12.3 -1.3 75.9
Ireland 109.4 -11.7 97.7 0.3 -7.5 1.5 92.1
France 107.1 -22.1 85.0 -4.9 -5.2 -1.8 73.1
Netherlands 106.3 -31.1 75.2 0.7 3.1 1.3 80.4
Germany 104.7 -24.0 80.8 -4.0 -2.6 0.7 74.9
Denmark 101.0 -19.8 81.2 -0.3 4.7 -0.3 85.3
Austria 100.7 -19.0 81.7                1.6 78.7
United_States 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Italy 98.5 -13.4 85.1 -4.2 -8.1 0.9 73.6
Finland 90.4 -13.0 77.4 -4.5 0.9 0.3 74.1
Sweden 88.9 -13.8 75.1 -0.5 4.2 -2.3 76.5
Switzerland 87.2 -15.5 71.7 1.8 11.4 1.2 86.1
Canada 86.6 -4.4 82.1 -2.9 1.8 2.6 83.6
United_Kingdom 86.2 -10.2 76.1 -0.6 -1.1 -0.9 73.5
Australia 84.0 -4.8 79.2 -1.8 1.4 0.5 79.4
Japan 75.8 -4.0 71.8 3.6 -1.0 0.7 75.1
Iceland 74.7 -2.4 72.3 2.7 11.8 -1.7 85.2
Spain 73.8 -2.6 71.2 -5.9 -6.6 1.5 60.2
New_Zealand 66.1 -4.2 62.0 -0.2 1.6 -0.8 62.5
Greece 61.8 1.9 63.7 -3.2 -11.3 0.4 49.6
Slovenia 60.1 2.1 62.2                52.9
Portugal 54.1 -4.6 49.6 1.9 0.1 0.8 52.4
Hungary 50.6 -2.9 47.7 -1.2 -9.5 1.0 38.1
Cyprus 47.9 6.2 54.1                55.2
Malta 46.8 2.1 48.9                38.9
Czech 43.9 1.0 44.9 -1.6 -1.9 2.3 43.7
Slovak 42.6 2.4 45.0 -7.3 -2.6 1.9 37.1
Korea 36.8 11.5 48.3 2.3 -6.9 3.2 46.9
Poland 33.2 5.8 39.0 -6.2 -4.8 1.2 29.2
Mexico 33.0 3.3 36.3 1.8 -11.1 -2.1 24.8
Turkey 27.6 0.8 28.4 -1.4 -8.1 -0.6 18.3
Estonia 24.3 2.2 26.5                29.9
Lithuani 21.5 3.3 24.8                26.2
Latvia 18.0 2.6 20.6                23.4
OECD 78.7 -3.0 75.7 -0.3 -6.0 -0.1 69.3
EU-15 (old)a 94.0 -15.0 79.0 -1.4 -5.7 0.1 72.1
EU-10 (new)b 36.6 3.8 40.4 -5.0 -4.9 1.4 33.6
EU-25 (enlarged)c 83.0 -9.9 73.1 -2.3 -5.9 0.5 65.8
a) referring to membership of the European Union  until 30 April 2004
b) referring to new membership of the European Union as of 1 May 2004
c) referring to all members of the European Union as of 1 May 2004
d) calculated on the basis of actual hours worked per person per year
e) sum of columns 1 and 2
f) calculated on the basis of the ratio of employment to labour force
g) calculated on the basis of labour force to population 15-64
h) calcul;ated on the basis of employment as a percent of the population age 15-64
i) sum of columns 3,4, 5& 6
Source: TCB/GGDC database, based on OECD National Accounts, Economic Outlook, 
and Labour Force Statistics, with GDP converted to US$ at 2002 EKS PPPs.
Table 1: Decomposition of labor productivity level (US=100) into effects of working 
hours, labour force participation and GDP per Capita, 2002 
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Ireland 4.7 -1.2 3.5 -0.2 3.6 -0.7 6.2
Poland 4.7 0.3 5.0 -1.2 -0.9 0.2 3.1
Korea 4.4 -0.2 4.1 -1.3 3.8 -1.8 4.9
Slovak 3.3 0.0 3.3 -1.9 -0.7 0.5 1.2
Malta 3.2 -0.1 3.1                3.5
Slovenia 3.0 0.3 3.2                1.9
Hungary 2.8 0.3 3.1 -0.2 -1.6 0.2 1.5
Norway 2.8 -0.6 2.2 0.1 0.8 -0.3 2.8
Cyprus 2.7 0.1 2.8                3.0
Finland 2.7 -0.4 2.3 -1.1 0.2 0.1 1.5
Germany 2.6 -0.9 1.7 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 1.2
Portugal 2.6 -0.8 1.8 0.4 0.0 0.2 2.4
Australia 2.3 -0.2 2.1 -2.5 2.0 0.7 2.4
United_Kingdom 2.3 -0.2 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
Austria 2.2 -0.9 1.3                1.6
Sweden 2.1 0.2 2.3 0.2 -2.1 1.1 1.6
Greece 2.0 0.1 2.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.2
Denmark 2.0 0.1 2.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.9
Belgium 2.0 -0.6 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.7
Japan 2.0 -0.8 1.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0
Turkey 1.9 0.1 2.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 1.4
Canada 1.7 -0.3 1.5 -0.7 0.4 0.6 1.8
Luxembourg 1.7 -0.4 1.3 0.0 2.1 0.1 3.4
United_States 1.5 0.3 1.7                1.7
France 1.4 -0.4 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.4
Estonia 1.4 -0.4 1.0                1.0
Italy 1.3 -0.3 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.3
Czech 1.3 -0.4 0.9 -0.5 -0.6 0.7 0.6
New_Zealand 1.0 0.0 1.0 -0.3 2.3 -1.3 1.8
Netherlands 0.9 -0.6 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.4 1.9
Spain 0.8 -0.1 0.7 0.9 1.1 -0.2 2.4
Iceland 0.7 -0.1 0.6 0.2 1.0 -0.1 1.6
Switzerland 0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
Mexico 0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.8 0.2 1.2
Lithuani -1.1 -0.3 -1.4                -1.6
Latvia -1.6 -0.3 -2.0                -2.0
  
EU-15 (old)a 1.9 -0.4 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.7
EU-10 (new)b 3.0 0.1 3.1 0.6 -1.1 -0.8 1.7
EU-25 (enlarged)c 2.1 -0.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7
OECD 1.8 -0.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6
a) referring to membership of the European Union  until 30 April 2004
b) referring to new membership of the European Union as of 1 May 2004
c) referring to all members of the European Union as of 1 May 2004
d) calculated on the basis of actual hours worked per person per year
e) sum of columns 1 and 2
f) calculated on the basis of the ratio of employment to labour force
g) calculated on the basis of labour force to population 15-64
h) calcul;ated on the basis of employment as a percent of the population age 15-64
i) sum of columns 3,4, 5& 6
Source: TCB/GGDC database, based on OECD National Accounts, Economic Outlook, 
and Labour Force Statistics, with GDP converted to US$ at 2002 EKS PPPs.
Table 2: Decomposition of labor productivity growth into effects of working hours, 




2.3 The role of hours worked  
There has been concern that not only participation but also hours per worker might be negatively 
related to productivity. Indeed, Figure 1 seems to tell a clear story that OECD countries with low 
working hours per worker typically score better on productivity than countries with high working 
hours. The U.S. appears to be an exception to this rule, with high productivity levels as well as high 
hours worked per person. Indeed the relationship between hours per worker and productivity in Figure 
1 has motivated this research project. 
 
However, despite the suggested relationship in Figure 1, one has to be very cautious on how 
to interpret this relationship. Figure 1 tells a second important story, which is relevant for this paper, 
namely that countries that have low working hours also typically have higher per capita income 
levels. Figure 1 also shows that hours worked are quite strongly related to per capita income. As 
economies increase their income, workers often choose to work fewer hours as they trade off work for 
more leisure. This tendency for workers in richer countries to work fewer hours makes it difficult to 
separate the long-term structural trends in relation to per capita income from shorter-term productivity 
trade-offs associated with changes in participation since productivity is strongly correlated with per 
capita income. Although the relationship is not as strong as for labour productivity (implying that 
lower total hours also means lower participation), again the U.S. (and Luxembourg and Korea) appear 
to be the main exceptions here.  
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Figure 1 Annual number of hours worked per person employed relative to labour productivity 
per hour and per capita income (2002) 
Source: TCB/GGDC Total Economy Database 
 
 
Figure 2 shows hours per person for several regions. While there are differences across 
countries within regions, two important observations can be drawn from the figure. First, in Europe 
hours per person are much lower than in other areas of the world. Second, since the early 1980s, 
European hours worked per person have diverged from North America as European hours have fallen 
whereas those in North America have risen. Interestingly, Asian countries, most of which in this 
sample are the higher income “tiger” economies, have begun to show declines in working hours per 
person, although from a very high level. In this respect the trend in North America seems somewhat 
of an outlier, as in most countries hours worked decline when per capita income increases.  
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Pacific
Eastern Europe
Note: North America includes the United States, Mexico and Canada. 
          Nothern and Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
         Southern Europe includes Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey
         Eastern Asia and the Pacific includes Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea
         Eastern Europe includes Czech Republic, Hungary,  Poland, and Slovakia.
Region numbers have been calculated by summing each countries' hours and employment, therefore they are weighted aggregates. 
                  
 
 
Assuming a negative relationship between hours per worker and productivity could be 
econometrically identified (an issue we will return to in Section 4), the question of what it means 
remains. One interpretation could be that a rise in working hours increases fatigue, etc.. But as work 
weeks in most countries in our sample are generally at or below 40 hours, it is unlikely that strong 
negative productivity effects will emerge when currently employed workers increase hours. An 
alternative interpretation might be that cuts in weekly working hours observed in several European 
countries, are part of a process that is weeding out unproductive firms and raising average 
productivity performance. This would give a very different interpretation to an observed negative 
relationship. We will return to this issue in Sections 3 and 4. 
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
The empirical investigation focuses on the relationship between productivity and participation. As 
discussed in the previous section the relationship between productivity, hours per worker and the 
employment rate is part of a simple accounting identity that includes per capita income. By definition 
labour productivity times hours worked per employed person times the employment are equals per 























        (4) 
 
where Y is GDP, P is population, H is total hours worked and E is total employed persons. 


















Y loglogloglog     (5) 
 
Since Equations (4) and (5) are identities, they cannot be estimated directly in order to assess 
the effect of a change in any of the right hand side variables to productivity. At least one variable has 
to be omitted to estimate this effect. If we take per capita income as the omitted variable we have the 














Y logloglog 310     (6) 
 
Where the α’s are constant parameters and the residual of this equation approximates the per 
capita income growth. Omitting per capita income from the estimation equation essentially puts it in 
the “residual” or error term of the estimating equation.  
 
Estimation was carried out using a set of panel regressions of labour productivity growth on 
participation with the variables measured over varying time intervals, annual, 2-year, 3-year, 5-year 
and, for completeness, 7- and 10 -years. While we estimate the model for the longer periods, we 
caution that the longer the interval the more likely other factors, technological and policy changes, for 
example, will tend to dominate the relationships.  
 
The idea behind this estimation strategy is that any trade-off between participation and 
productivity should be greatest initially and then diminish over time. If increased participation 
decreases productivity because the new workers are less skilled or in other ways different from 
existing workers, on-the-job learning and training should tend to reduce these differences as they 
relate to workplace performance. Thus the relationship for any set of new participants should be 
temporary and weaken over time. In turn the observed trade-off should diminish when the 
measurement interval is extended. 
 
3.1 Measurement of Growth Rates 
In estimating the model we experimented with two econometric specifications, overlapping and non-
overlapping. For annual observations, there are no differences between the procedures. One simply 
takes all possible one year growth rates from the initial observation to the last specification as the 
sample. For the longer intervals the overlapping observations would use all possible growth periods. 
For example for the regression involving 3-year growth rates, years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, 4-6, etc. would be 
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used to calculate the sample growth rates. In this case, for example, year 2 would be in both the first 
and the second observation, hence they are overlapping. 
 
While we prefer the overlapping specification to structure the observations, we also ran the 
estimations with non-overlapping time spans or growth periods. For example, years 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, etc. 
were used as observations for the 3-year panels. Similarly, years 1-4, 5-8, 9-12 were used for the 4-
year growth rates. This alternative cuts the sample size significantly, but as it turns out, both methods 
give very similar qualitative results.3  
 
3.2 Controls 
Each regression was run with and without controls. Controls included initial productivity levels and 
country fixed effects. The initial productivity control was designed to allow for regression to the mean 
since lower productivity countries might have faster productivity growth due to catch-up. The country 















Y logloglog 310 ααα   + c*Dj + d* (Y/Hj,t0 ) + ε  (7) 
 
where j stands for country and the t stands for the time span over which the growth is 
measured. As noted above, the time spans included 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. The initial productivity 
controls were measured at the beginning of the time span.  
 
3.3 Labour Participation Measures 
In our empirical work we focus on estimates of the model using the employment/ population ratios, 
which provides a direct measure of the proportion of the population working and offers a broad 
measure of participation for an economy. There are two principal reasons for focusing on this broad 
measure of participation instead of, for example a narrower labour force participation measure based 
on the labour force (employment plus formally unemployed persons) relative to the working age 
population. First, the employment rate is both more widely available and less subject to measurement 
differences across the 36 countries in our sample than, for example, labour force which is – amongst 
other things – affected by the measure of unemployment. Second, the working age population, 
measured as 15-64 year olds, is somewhat of an arbitrary measure as people older than 64 may still be 
working.4 Thirdly, explorations with other measures had no significant effects on the results, as shown 
in Appendix 3. This is not unexpected since the differences in working age to population ratios are 
very similar in Europe.  
 
3.4 Level Estimates 
In addition to the basic panel approach, we estimated equation (4) directly in levels. Here we 
regressed productivity levels (which are PPP-converted) on the employment rate and hours per worker 
                                                     
3 The full estimates results for the alternative approaches are reported in Appendix 3. 
4 Measures involving workforce totals and other labour market concepts like unemployment may be more useful 
in analysis of specific policy issues such as the proportion of income retained when out-of-work and length of 
unemployment benefits. Dealing with these issues is far beyond the scope of this project.  
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across countries. These cross-section or point-in-time estimates typically isolate the longer-term or 
structural relationships. Even if increases in participation lead to lower productivity in the short-run, 
as businesses and workers adjust and learn, the more fundamental factors should show up in the cross-
country regressions. Nonetheless, since individual cross-sections can be dominated by special events, 
such as for example the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, we estimate the cross-section regressions for a 
number of different years.  
 
 
4. Results of Regression Analysis 
 
As discussed in detail in the data annex (Appendix 1), the estimations focus on a sample of thirty-six 
countries for the years 1970 to 2002. 
  
4.1 Endogenity and Modification of Basic Equation 
Estimating equation (7) directly provides estimates for the effects of changes in both participation 
rates and hours worked per person employed on productivity. Unfortunately, estimating the model 
with the hours worked included raises an important econometric problem. As argued in Section 2 the 
change in hours worked per person is directly related to the change in per capita income, which is 
represented by the residual in equation (7). This strong correlation between the hours variable and the 
error term makes the interpretation of the coefficient of H/E on productivity impossible.5  
 
So most of our discussion of the model focuses on a restricted version of Equation (7), one in 
which we set the coefficient on hours worked per person equals to zero. This gives  
 








Y αα ε   (8)  
      
as the basic specification and leaves both hours worked and per capita income in the residual.  
 
4.2 Productivity and Participation 
Table 3 provides the basic panel regressions, with growth in productivity (measured as output per 
hour) as the dependent variable and the employment rate as the independent variable, for two periods 
(1970-2002 and 1992-2002) and all 36 countries for which we have data.6 The top panel of the table 
provides the results of regressions with the full sample of countries covering 1970-2002, which 
represents an unbalanced panel, and the bottom panel gives the results for the same of countries 
covering 1990-2002, now representing a balanced panel. The first and third columns show the simple 
regressions without control variables, and the second and fourth include the control variables.  
 
                                                     
5 The r-squared across countries between hours per worker and per capita income is more than 0.50 for the 
1990s and the relationship is negative, with higher per capita income associated with lower hours worked. This 
endogenity problem cannot be solved easily. In order to do so one would need an instrumental variable that 
could purge the relationship between H/P and Y/P, but is not correlated with Y/H.  
6 See Appendix 3, Table A3.3 for alternative specifications of the independent variable, such as 
employment/working age population and labour force/working age population. 
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Employment to Population Growth
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled
Annual -0.228 -0.213 -0.228 -0.213
[3.71]** [3.30]** [3.71]** [3.30]**
2-year -0.112 -0.069 -0.11 -0.053
[1.88] [1.10] [1.32] [0.60]
3-year -0.063 -0.005 -0.124 -0.067
[1.06] [0.07] [1.18] [0.56]
5-year -0.017 0.045 -0.038 0.061
[0.28] [0.74] [0.33] [0.50]
7-year 0.017 0.051 -0.088 0.031
[0.27] [0.86] [0.62] [0.24]
10-year 0.07 0.015 -0.031 0.299
[1.04] [0.26] [0.18] [1.30]
Employment to Population Growth
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled
Annual -0.256 -0.165 -0.256 -0.165
[3.14]** [1.77] [3.14]** [1.77]
2-year -0.178 -0.002 -0.069 0.141
[2.08]* [0.02] [0.61] [1.01]
3-year -0.137 0.092 -0.118 0.145
[1.60] [0.85] [0.83] [0.76]
5-year -0.103 0.296 -0.254 -0.112
[1.13] [2.46]* [1.68] [0.46]
7-year -0.111 0.554 -0.47 -0.895
[1.09] [3.92]** [1.96] [.]
10-year -0.158 0.749 -0.294 0.631
[1.14] [3.73]** [1.37] [.]
1990-2002
Overlapping No Overlapping
Table 3: Effect of Change in Employment/Population Ratios on 
Value Added per Hour Growth
1970-2002
Overlapping No Overlapping
Grey are preferred results
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Those t statistics which are blank do not contain enough 
observations
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
See Appendix 3, Tables A3.1 and A3.2 for details
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For the sample of countries examined here there is significant evidence of a negative 
relationship between growth in labour productivity and growth in participation measured by the 
employment rate.7 These negative relationships are obtained with and without controls. However, the 
tradeoff is relatively small and typically only lasts for a year or two. 
 
Table 3 shows a significant negative coefficient on labour participation in the annual panel, 
suggesting that for shorter intervals the negative relationship between productivity and participation is 
strong. This is true both for the controlled and uncontrolled regressions (Columns 1 and 2). However, 
we find no significant relationship for the employment rate and productivity growth for longer 
measurement intervals. This indicates that while the negative relationship is quite strong over short 
periods, in the long-term the structural relationship is quite flat. Moreover, the short-run is fairly short. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 offer the same regressions but focus on non-overlapping years beyond the 1-
year estimate. Strikingly, the non-overlapping time spans, which cut the sample size significantly, do 
not change the results.  
 
The results in the bottom panel of Table 3 are for the most recent time period 1990-2002. The 
regression based on one-year growth rates shows a somewhat larger and significant tradeoff 
coefficient, but the 2-year, 3-year and 5-year coefficients are in the same range as shown for the 
unbalanced panel and not significant. The 2-year coefficient is significantly negative for the 
uncontrolled overlapping regression. But the controlled regressions are similar regardless of the 
specification. Strikingly the coefficients for the controlled overlapping time spans for 1990-2002 
become even significantly positive for the 1990s, implying that increased participation raises rather 
than reduces productivity after 5 years. Again we stress that other factors are more likely to be 
impacting the longer time spans, which makes these positive results somewhat problematic. 
A key conclusion that shows up consistently is that the elasticity estimates for the 
productivity-participation tradeoff in almost all cases less than .3. In turn this means that increases in 
productivity mostly go to the bottom line, which is increased per capita income. 
 
4.3 Hours worked per person employed 
We looked at various regressions involving hours per worker as the independent variable and per 
capita income as the dependent variable. Unfortunately, the strong relationship between productivity 
and per capita income make it very difficult to interpret the estimated relationships. For example, we 
estimated equation (7) directly and found that the pattern of coefficients on hours per worker was 
quite high between -0.5 and -0.77 for growth intervals of 1 to 10 years for the 1970-2002 unbalanced 
panels. When using the balanced panel available from 1990-92, which is the most reliable, the 
coefficients were even higher. However, instead of declining they increased (in absolute value) as the 
measurement interval was made wider. For the annual growth span the coefficient was -0.80, for the 
3-year span -1.05 and for the 5-year internval -1.31 and each was statistically significant. These 
                                                     
7 For growing populations with stable participation rates (or with employment growth not declining faster than 
participation increases in declining populations), increased employment rates imply a positive relationship 
between participation and employment. So focusing on the relationship between participation and productivity 
provides information on the relationship between productivity and employment and vice versa. Thus, we also 
observe a negative relationship of employment and productivity growth. 
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coefficients on H/E are unreasonably large and show no tendency to decline over time, which is 
clearly implausible given the actuakhours worked per persons in the countries in our sample. 
 
4.4 Comparison with other studies 
Our estimates of the coefficient of participation on productivity are considerably smaller than those 
reported in recent work at the Banque of France. Belorgey et al. (2004) estimate the long term 
productivity (on per employee basis) elasticities with regard to participation for a sample of 25 
industrial countries over the period 1990-2002. They obtain estimates of -0.5 with regard to the 
employment rate and -0.35 with regard to hours worked per person. 
 
On this basis, Cette (2004) and Bourlès and Cette (2005) estimate the average labour 
productivity levels for the European Union relative to the U.S. in 2002, with an adjustment for 
participation and working hours.8 Given the large tradeoffs implied by the work of Belorgey et al., 
Cette concludes that US productivity is structurally higher than all European countries (except 
Norway) even though some of them have higher measured productivity levels (e.g. France and 
Germany). On average, the EU productivity level comes out about 10 %-points lower at 81.9% 
instead of 91.6% relative to the U.S.  
 
In the light of our previous remarks, it seems to us that there are some problems with the 
estimates in these studies. Their model is based on a reduced form production function. It is estimated 
with GMM with past growth in productivity, ICT expenditures, capacity utilization, investment rates, 
change in hours worked and change in total employment as controls. The GMM estimation is 
supposedly taking account of endogenity effects, but it is unlikely that it is adequate for the issue at 
hand, given the strong relationship between hours and per capita income and the need for a truly 
independent instrument. That said, the estimate of -.35 is much less than the erratic estimates we 
reported in the last section on the basis of directly estimating equation (7) with OLS.  
 
By using an auto-regressive framework with 2 lags, Cette and associates take the -.35 as a 
steady state or long-run equilibrium value. In light of our analysis this seems much higher than it 
should be. McGuckin and Van Ark (2004) argue at some length that the relatively high productivity 
levels for some EU countries, as compared to those in the US, must be approached cautiously because 
of the observed differences in labour participation and hours worked. The present study shows, this 
does not mean that the trade-offs continue indefinitely. If Europe would continue to increase its 
participation levels the effects on productivity levels in the longer term will be quite small. 
 
                                                     
8 Bourlès and Cette (2005) also include effects by age class and gender (see below). 
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4.5 Level estimates 
Table 4 shows the results of cross-section regressions for the years 1992, 1995, 2000 and 2002. In 
these regressions the productivity level is the dependent and employment participation is the 
independent variable. In all cases the coefficient on the employment rate is positive, but in no case is 
it significant. Since, as discussed earlier, these simple cross-section specifications are likely to reflect 
long-run or “equilibrium” relationships, these results strongly support the panel results, which 
suggested a short term trade-off and rapid adjustment. Similar results were found for other other 
participation measures such as labour force/working age population. 
 
1992 1995 2000 2002
Ratio of Employment to 
Population 9.01 8.66 46.37 47.854
t stat [0.34] [0.30] [1.57] [1.72]
 
Table 4:  Effect of Employment/Population on 
Labour Productivity Level (Cross Section) 1992-
2002
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
See Appendix 3, Tables A3.4 for details
 
 
In Table 5 we report similar regressions with hours per employee as the independent variable. 
These regressions were run for the same 4 years used for the participation ratio. The correlations are 
very high with r-squares of over 70%, reflecting the close relationship between hours, productivity 
and per capita income. The elasticity on H/E is consistently about -0.04. This is very small, 
particularly in relationship to the biased estimates from equation (7) discussed earlier,and even from 
the much lower estimates (-0.35) from the studies by Cette and associates. 
 
1992 1995 2000 2002
Level of Hours per 
Employee -0.036 -0.039 -0.039 -0.04
t stat [9.25]** [10.98]** [10.66]** [9.87]**
 
Table 5: Effect of Hours per Employed Person on 
Labour Productivity Level (Cross Section) 1992-
2002
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
See Appendix 3, Tables A3.5 for details  
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We think the estimate on the hours worked coefficient is much more in line with economic 
logic. Increases in H/E can come from new jobs (increased participation) or more hours worked by 
workers already in the workforce. As discussed earlier, the latter group offers little likelihood of 
reducing productivity as they work longer. But increased hours from employees who were formerly 
unemployed are more likely to be associated with lower skills and need training and on-the-job 
learning. This group, likely to be relatively small when compared to all workers, would be 
contributing to the negative effect of increased hours on productivity we observed. So the small 
coefficient on hours worked in the cross section fits well with a priori reasoning.  
 
4.6 Per capita income and participation 
Table 6 shows the results of regressing growth in per capita income on the employment rate, using the 
same specifications as used for productivity. Equation (1) shows participation increases generate one-
for-one increases in per capita income, unless offset by falling productivity or lower hours. To test 
this, we ran the per capita income regressions on participation directly. In both cases (the long period 
1970-2002 and the shorter perid 1990-2002) the coefficient on participation is positive, indicating that 
even though there is a loss in productivity as participation increases, it is more than offset by higher 
per capita income growth. Moreover, the longer the time interval, the larger is the gain in per capita 
income. Finally, Table 7 shows positive level effects in the cross section regression. 
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Employment to Population Growth
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled
Annual 0.702 0.705 0.702 0.705
[13.41]** [13.34]** [13.41]** [13.34]**
2-year 0.816 0.831 0.838 0.858
[15.57]** [15.85]** [11.74]** [11.97]**
3-year 0.866 0.891 0.805 0.825
[16.41]** [17.17]** [8.94]** [8.80]**
5-year 0.874 0.911 0.812 0.864
[16.69]** [18.37]** [8.05]** [8.85]**
7-year 0.863 0.874 0.788 0.826
[16.22]** [18.44]** [6.44]** [7.99]**
10-year 0.836 0.759 0.79 0.876
[15.03]** [18.04]** [4.93]** [5.08]**
Employment to Population Growth
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled
Annual 0.741 0.845 0.741 0.845
[9.43]** [9.85]** [9.43]** [9.85]**
2-year 0.796 0.968 0.918 1.106
[9.45]** [10.44]** [8.26]** [8.80]**
3-year 0.793 0.987 0.879 1.082
[9.27]** [10.47]** [6.33]** [6.56]**
5-year 0.757 0.95 0.579 0.682
[8.30]** [9.72]** [3.92]** [3.51]**
7-year 0.719 0.799 0.456 0.304
[7.06]** [7.89]** [2.05]* [.]
10-year 0.655 0.364 0.563 0.967
[4.69]** [2.55]* [2.48]* [.]
Overlapping No Overlapping
No Overlapping





Grey are preferred results
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Those t statistics which are blank do not contain enough 
observations
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
See Appendix 3, Tables A3.6 and A3.7 for details
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1992 1995 2000 2002
Ratio of Employment to 
Population 37,463.90 38,601.51 68,771.04 69,394.41
t stat [2.18]* [2.10]* [3.52]** [3.80]**
 
Table 7:  Effect of Employment/Population on Per 
Capita Income Level (Cross Section) 1992-2002
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
See Appendix 3, Tables A3.8 for details  
 
 
5 The Impacts of Age, Gender and Skill on the Trade-offs 
 
In this section we extend the analyses of the previous section to examine the role of gender and age in 
terms of the tradeoff. As we show later in the section, age and gender are both also associated with 
lower skill levels as measured by educational attainment, but we were unable to sort out the respective 
importance of the three factors together. Moreover, interpretation of the regressions must be 
undertaken with some care since the dependent variable is aggregate productivity, not productivity for 
the female, young or old workers. There simply are no data that provide productivity for any of the 
gender and age decompositions of employees. Despite this, the results are quite informative. 
 
5.1 Age 
The reduced inflow of young people into the labour market in many advanced countries and the 
increased popularity of early retirement schemes together with increasing life expectations make the 
issue of ‘active ageing’ highly important nowadays. The relationship between age and individual 
productivity has been discussed widely in the literature.9 The old and young are often thought to be 
less productive, the young for lack of training and experience and the old because their skills are out 
of date and they may be less able to keep up because of declining stamina and related characteristics. 
But there may be equally good arguments to assume to be opposite, because the old have accumulated 
more human capital and have gained more experience, and the young who have acquired the latest 
most up-to-date skills. 
 
Indeed, in general our analysis shows small effects of age in terms of a productivity tradeoff. 
Based on our panel regressions, we found virtually no difference in growth in productivity associated 
with an increase in employment/population ratios of working young (age 15-24) or the working old 
(age 55-64).10 This is true whether we controlled for initial productivity or not. With the controls, the 
trade-offs for productivity growth were only .05 for older workers (55-64) and just over .06 for young 
workers (15-64). For the older workers panel, the effects on productivity turned even positive beyond 
                                                     
9 For example, Skirbekk (2003) gives an overview of the different approaches that are used to measure job 
performance differences by age. See also Barnes et al. (1999). For effect of gender see, for example, Walby and 
Olsen ( 2002) and Rubery et al (2003). 
10 As before we discuss only on the results for overlapping models with control variables, but as the tables 
demonstrate, in general the results between the various tests do not differ much. 
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5 years, but remained slightly negative (although less than in the first year) for the younger panel. 
(Table 8). 
 
For per capita income growth, the coefficient on the participation rates were always 
significantly positive and after one year they were larger than the (negative) coefficient for 
productivity. This seems to indicate that the gains to income are not great in the first year, particularly 
for the older group. But as we found for the aggregate participation rates covering all employees 
reported earlier, the gains grow as the time period in extended. Moreover, since the percentage of the 
employment of the younger and older age groups in total employment is less than 10%, the aggregate 
impact is very small. . 
 
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled
Annual -0.08 -0.061 -0.08 -0.061
[3.63]** [2.94]** [3.63]** [2.94]**
3-year -0.083 -0.046 -0.108 -0.085
[4.34]** [3.07]** [3.47]** [3.26]**
5-year -0.082 -0.023 -0.114 -0.002
[3.79]** [1.56] [2.13]* [0.04]
7-year -0.1 -0.036 -0.092 -0.041
[3.76]** [2.22]* [1.54] [0.81]
10-year -0.145 -0.044 -0.29 0.217
[3.69]** [1.72] [2.32]* [1.23]
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled
Annual -0.068 -0.05 -0.068 -0.05
[3.84]** [2.76]** [3.84]** [2.76]**
3-year -0.031 0.026 -0.034 0.01
[1.85] [1.65] [1.26] [0.38]
5-year -0.036 0.048 -0.046 0.032
[2.02]* [3.15]** [1.37] [0.97]
7-year -0.04 0.053 -0.05 0.02
[1.98]* [3.50]** [1.18] [0.37]
10-year -0.04 0.058 -0.101 0.062
[1.68] [3.52]** [1.99] [1.02]
Older Panels (55-64)
Overlapping No Overlapping
Table 8: Effect of Change in Employment/Population Ratios of Age 
Groups on Value Added per Hour Growth, 1970-2002
Younger Panels (15-24)
Overlapping No Overlapping
Grey are preferred results
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Those t statistics which are blank do not contain enough 
observations
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
See Appendix 3, Tables A3.10 and A3.13 for details
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5.2 Gender 
Table 9 shows the panel regressions for females. Here the tradeoff coefficients are much stronger than 
for the age effect, suggesting that much of the trade-off is associated with increases in female 
participation.11 Moreover, the trade-off is significant for all time spans. This suggests that the 
productivity losses due to increased participation have been highest for females. But even here the 
trade-off is not big compared to the gains in per capita income. For all periods, except the one-year 
and the 10-year estimate the positive effects on per capita income surpass the negative effects on 
productivity. Still since many women enter the labour market through part-time work, the per capita 
income gains are less than those for all workers (including full time workers) combined.  
 
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled
Annual -0.345 -0.374 -0.345 -0.374
[9.03]** [9.75]** [9.03]** [9.75]**
3-year -0.189 -0.219 -0.246 -0.283
[5.29]** [6.46]** [4.09]** [4.86]**
5-year -0.173 -0.197 -0.217 -0.168
[4.42]** [5.58]** [2.73]** [1.90]
7-year -0.199 -0.279 -0.22 -0.368
[4.29]** [7.35]** [2.17]* [2.72]*
10-year -0.18 -0.331 -0.454 -0.422
[3.18]** [7.02]** [3.59]** [1.55]
Table 9: Effect of Change in Employment/Population Ratios of 
Females on Value Added per Hour Growth, 1970-2002
Overlapping No Overlapping
Grey are preferred results
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Those t statistics which are blank do not contain enough 
observations
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
See Appendix 3, Tables A3.14 and A3.15 for details
 
 
In interpreting these results it is important to consider whether the substantive trade-off 
between aggregate productivity growth and female participation could be related to a lower level of 
educational attainment (as a proxy for skills) of women relative to men. In addition, females who (re-
)enter the workforce later in life (perhaps after their children are grown) may have significantly less 
on-the-job experience.  
 
Table 10 provides data on compensation (wages) for men and woman for by age for European 
countries in 1995. These data suggest the gap in pay between males and females is very small for 
younger age groups, but substantial for older workers. 
                                                     
11 For literature on the relationship between female participation and productivity see, for example, Walby and 
Olsen ( 2002) and Rubery et al (2003). 
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region and
country Males Female Difference Males Female Difference Males Female Difference Males Female Difference
(Thousands)
.
Denmark 156 158 -2.1 216 186 29.7 286 238 48.3 288 234 54.4
Sweden 149                 178 161 17.2 237 202 35.8 235 192 42.7
    
Total 152 158 -5.7 197 174 23.4 262 220 42.0 261 213 48.5
2) EU_15
Austria 18 15 3.3 25 18 6.9 32 23 9.1 40 26 14.3
Belgium 18 14 3.8 20 18 2.6 29 25 3.6 36 29 6.8
Finland 15 13 1.8 18 15 2.9 24 19 5.3 25 18 7.0
France 12 12 -0.5 14 14 0.0 24 20 4.9 31 23 7.6
Germany 20 17 3.9 23 19 3.5 31 24 7.3 35 24 10.7
Greece 6 6 0.8 7 7 0.8 13 10 3.1 14 9 5.5
Ireland 11 10 1.0 16 13 2.2 27 19 8.1 29 19 9.4
Italy 12 11 0.3 14 13 1.1 22 17 4.4 24 20 4.2
Luxembourg 17 18 -1.4 21 20 0.6 32 28 3.9 39 30 9.1
Netherlands 11 10 1.3 18 15 2.6 30 22 7.9 36 24 12.0
Portugal 4 4 0.3 5 5 0.7 9 7 2.6 10 6 3.1
Spain 7 7 0.7 10 9 1.5 18 14 4.0 20 15 4.6
United Kingdom 9 8 1.1 13 11 2.4 20 14 5.7 17 11 6.1
    
Total 12 11 1.3 16 14 2.1 24 19 5.4 27 20 7.7
Age 0-19 Age 20-24 Age 25-54 Age 55 and up 
Table 10: Total Compensation per Employee for 1995, by gender and age
Note: Compensation is in each country's national currency
Source: Eurostat, Structure of Earnings Statistics - 1995
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This may be consistent with the lack of experience by re-integrated women, who will work on 
a part time basis and the lower educational attainments of older women. However, as extensively 
indicated in the literature, there might also be a substantial discriminatory element in wage 
differentials between men and women.12 Nonetheless, if wages at least partly pick up skill differences, 
the smaller gender differences for the younger age groups suggest that the skill levels of men and 
women are converging. 
 
Indeed, as shown in our scattered data on education below, except for the age-group above 55 
years old, educational attainment levels of women are not lower than that of men. Currently, males 
and females have similar participation rates in the younger age groups and ongoing trends in the 
educational attainment are positive for females. In fact, for Europe it appears that educational 
attainment for younger females is already higher than for males (see Table A2.19 in Appendix 2). 
These factors suggest that the skill levels of female workers are likely to be higher in the future and 
that the estimates for our sample, which are based on historical data, are likely to overstate trade-offs 
in the future.13  
 
5.3 Skills 
While we have been able to collect and analyze a substantial amount of information on levels of 
educational attainment, it has not proved possible to assess the impact of differences in skill levels 
over time and across countries on productivity. One of the key problems is that there is no flow 
information on the characteristics of people entering the labour market vis-à-vis those who are already 
in the labour force. For example, the educational attainment and skill levels of new participants by age 
and gender may differ from the existing workforce. Differences in such characteristics will 
substantially influence any skill-adjusted participation measure.  
 
While we do not have flow information on skill levels, Table 11 provides information on the 
share of the labour force in three skill categories for 1992, 1995 and 2000 for the EU-15. The 
information is derived from Eurostat labour force survey information, and the skill levels are proxied 
by ISCED educational attainment levels (0-2: only pre-primary, primary or lower secondary 
education; 3-4: upper secondary education; 5-6: total tertiary education). The clearest inference from 
the table is that there has been a substantial decline in the share of workers with lower skills: from .48 
to .33 over the 8 year period. Correspondingly there has been an increase in the skills of workers over 
the period.  
 
                                                     
12 See, for example, Lips (2002) and Rubery et al. (2003). 
13 Another possibility is that – despite little difference in educational attainment between men and women – 
women are more intensively in industries with low productivity growth. This issue is not further analyzed in this 
study, as data on employment by industry and gender were not collected. 
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In Tables 12-14 we offer a similar set of tables, year–by-year broken down by gender. Table 
12 shows that the share of low skill jobs for males was higher by as much as 7 percentage points 
compared to females in 1992. But by 2000 females had just 3 points lower low skill jobs than males 
(Table 14). Overall there appears to be convergence in the distribution of males and females by skill 
levels.14
                                                     
14 See Annex 2, Tables A2.19 and A2.20 for more detailed breakdowns for persons employed instead of labour 
force, but covering a smaller range of countries. 
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region and year      year      year      
country 1992 1995 2000 1992 1995 2000 1992 1995 2000
EU_15
Austria 0.27 0.20 0.65 0.64 0.09 0.16
Belgium 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.33
Denmark 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.23 0.26 0.24
Finland 0.27 0.23 0.48 0.44 0.24 0.34
France 0.33 0.30 0.46 0.45 0.21 0.25
Germany 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.25 0.23 0.25
Greece 0.61 0.52 0.43 0.23 0.31 0.37 0.16 0.17 0.20
Ireland 0.46 0.41      0.30 0.33      0.24 0.26      
Italy 0.58 0.55 0.45 0.33 0.34 0.43 0.09 0.10 0.12
Luxembourg 0.57 0.50 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.19 0.21
Netherlands 0.30 0.45 0.25
Portugal 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.09
Spain 0.66 0.63 0.54 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.27
Sweden 0.24 0.20 0.48 0.49 0.28 0.30
UK 0.44 0.43 0.13 0.33 0.34 0.58 0.24 0.23 0.29
   
Total 0.48 0.40 0.33 0.31 0.39 0.44 0.21 0.21 0.24
Note: for employment shares in smaller range of countries, see Appendix 2, Table A2.17
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey
Low Skill Medium Skill Higher Skill
Table 11: Share of Labor Force, by skill level for years 1992, 1995, and 2000
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Males Females
region and region and
country low medium high country low medium high
EU_15 EU_15
Belgium 0.40 0.34 0.26 Belgium 0.27 0.32 0.41
Denmark 0.25 0.54 0.20 Denmark 0.29 0.46 0.25
Germany 0.14 0.58 0.27 Germany 0.20 0.58 0.23
Greece 0.63 0.23 0.14 Greece 0.57 0.23 0.20
Ireland 0.57 0.24 0.19 Ireland 0.26 0.40 0.34
Italy 0.61 0.30 0.09 Italy 0.52 0.38 0.10
Luxembour 0.56 0.27 0.17 Luxembour 0.59 0.26 0.15
Portugal 0.77 0.11 0.11 Portugal 0.66 0.11 0.22
Spain 0.71 0.13 0.16 Spain 0.56 0.15 0.29
UK 0.41 0.37 0.22 UK 0.47 0.27 0.26
  
Total 0.51 0.31 0.18 Total 0.44 0.32 0.24
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey
Skill Level Skill Level





region and region and
country low medium high country low medium high
EU_15 EU_15
Austria 0.21 0.69 0.09 Austria 0.33 0.59 0.08
Belgium 0.35 0.38 0.26 Belgium 0.29 0.36 0.35
Denmark 0.19 0.55 0.26 Denmark 0.21 0.53 0.26
Finland 0.28 0.48 0.24 Finland 0.27 0.49 0.24
France 0.32 0.48 0.20 France 0.34 0.43 0.24
Germany 0.13 0.60 0.27 Germany 0.18 0.63 0.19
Greece 0.55 0.30 0.16 Greece 0.49 0.32 0.19
Ireland 0.49 0.28 0.23 Ireland 0.28 0.41 0.32
Italy 0.59 0.31 0.09 Italy 0.48 0.40 0.12
Luxembour 0.48 0.33 0.20 Luxembour 0.55 0.28 0.17
Portugal 0.78 0.12 0.10 Portugal 0.72 0.12 0.16
Spain 0.66 0.15 0.19 Spain 0.56 0.18 0.26
Sweden 0.27 0.47 0.26 Sweden 0.22 0.49 0.29
UK 0.39 0.37 0.24 UK 0.47 0.30 0.22
  
Total 0.41 0.39 0.20 Total 0.38 0.39 0.22
Note: for employment shares in smaller range of countries, see Appendix 2, Table A2.18
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey
Skill Level Skill Level





region and region and
country low medium high country low medium high
EU_15 EU_15
Austria 0.17 0.66 0.17 Austria 0.24 0.62 0.14
Belgium 0.35 0.36 0.29 Belgium 0.25 0.36 0.39
Denmark 0.22 0.55 0.23 Denmark 0.21 0.52 0.26
Finland 0.25 0.45 0.30 Finland 0.21 0.42 0.38
France 0.30 0.47 0.23 France 0.30 0.42 0.28
Germany 0.15 0.57 0.28 Germany 0.19 0.60 0.21
Greece 0.46 0.36 0.18 Greece 0.39 0.39 0.23
Italy 0.50 0.40 0.11 Italy 0.36 0.49 0.14
Luxembour 0.31 0.47 0.21 Luxembour 0.35 0.45 0.21
Netherland 0.31 0.44 0.25 Netherland 0.29 0.47 0.24
Portugal 0.80 0.12 0.07 Portugal 0.74 0.14 0.12
Spain 0.58 0.18 0.24 Spain 0.46 0.21 0.33
Sweden 0.23 0.50 0.27 Sweden 0.18 0.48 0.34
UK 0.12 0.59 0.29 UK 0.15 0.57 0.29
  
Total 0.34 0.44 0.22 Total 0.31 0.44 0.25
Note: for employment shares in smaller range of countries, see Appendix 2, Table A2.18
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey
Skill Level Skill Level





6. Scenarios  
 
In this section we look at the future effects of increases in participation. A relatively simple way of 
doing this is by taking the coefficients from our regression analysis in Sections 3 and 4, and applying 
them to examine the impact of an increase in a country’s labour participation on per capita income. 
While not a perfect measure of living standards, GDP per capita is the key indicator on which we 
focus.  
 
The main scenario we study here involves setting each country’s ratio of employment to 
population to that of the country with the highest current ratio, which is Switzerland with a ratio of 
.57. In contrast the ratio is .48 for the U.S., .43 for the EU -15, .51 for the Netherlands and .40 for the 
EU-10 in 2002 (Table 15). The new employment to population ratio is then used to calculate GDP per 
capita using trade-off coefficients that are in the ballpark of our estimates in Section 4.  
We then assume that it would take a country 10 years to reach the leader's (Switzerland) 
employment to population ratio and our scenario provides some basic information on how fast GDP 
per capita would need to grow to accommodate for this increase in participation.  
 
The linear model we use assumes the same productivity trade-off for each country. Thus, each 
country’s GDP/capita changes by the same amount for each 1% change in employment to population 
ratio. Our basic scenario uses a coefficient of 0.845 on employment/population relative to per capita 
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income, which is an average of our coefficients estimated in Section 4, and which takes into account a 
trade-off coefficient of 0.155 in productivity due to increased participation.15  
 
Even though this scenarios it suggestive, it would need substantial work before they could be 
used for projected real world outcomes. Still, the results suggest that the new member states of the 
EU10, the “old” EU-15 and the “other OECD countries” stand to get the largest gain from increased 
participation as they are coming from low participation levels of 0.4, 0.43 and 0.38 respectively.. This 
means these regions would be able to improve their GDP per capita significantly by increasing their 
employment to population ratio. 
 
Overall in these scenarios, when the variable is pushed to the leader there are enormous 
increases in GDP per capita, even with reasonable assumptions on the negative impact of increased 
participation on labour productivity.  
For the older age group, GDP per capita increases vary from the EU-10 with 13% to the 
United States with 5%. Turkey could improve its GDP per capita by the most (19%) by increasing its 
ratio of employment to population. 
 
                                                     
15 In addition, for comparison purposes, we also tested a scenario based on a .5 coefficient and one which 
assumes no trade-off effects at all. We also looked at the effects on per capita income growth after 1 year. These 
alternative scenarios did not make much difference, so that the discussion here is focused on the effects after 10 
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1) United_States 0.48 34,100 1.85 -0.29 1.56 17 39,804
2) EU_15 0.43 24,600 2.79 -0.43 2.36 26 30,993
Austria 0.46 26,800 2.23 -0.35 1.88 21 32,325
Belgium 0.39 25,900 4.00 -0.62 3.38 39 36,090
Denmark 0.50 29,100 1.35 -0.21 1.14 12 32,560
Finland 0.46 25,300 2.29 -0.35 1.94 21 30,614
France 0.41 24,900 3.39 -0.52 2.87 33 33,063
Germany 0.44 25,500 2.62 -0.40 2.22 25 31,781
Greece 0.37 16,900 4.43 -0.69 3.74 44 24,407
Ireland 0.45 31,400 2.46 -0.38 2.08 23 38,549
Italy 0.41 25,100 3.33 -0.52 2.81 32 33,123
Netherlands 0.51 27,400 1.17 -0.18 0.99 10 30,242
Portugal 0.50 17,900 1.29 -0.20 1.09 11 19,893
Spain 0.40 20,500 3.57 -0.55 3.02 35 27,630
Sweden 0.49 26,100 1.66 -0.26 1.40 15 29,970
United_Kingdom 0.46 25,100 2.19 -0.34 1.85 20 30,116
3) EU_10 0.40 11,500 3.74 -0.58 3.16 36 15,629
Cyprus 0.49 18,800 1.64 -0.25 1.39 15 21,595
Czech 0.46 14,900 2.11 -0.33 1.78 19 17,785
Estonia 0.54 10,200 0.61 -0.09 0.52 5 10,741
Hungary 0.38 13,000 4.17 -0.64 3.53 41 18,353
Latvia 0.54 7,990 0.52 -0.08 0.44 4 8,347
Lithuani 0.50 8,943 1.26 -0.20 1.06 11 9,941
Malta 0.38 13,200 4.21 -0.65 3.56 42 18,793
Poland 0.36 9,970 4.83 -0.75 4.08 49 14,877
Slovak 0.39 12,600 3.84 -0.59 3.25 38 17,406
Slovenia 0.41 18,000 3.51 -0.54 2.97 34 24,150
4) Japan
Japan 0.50 25,600 1.39 -0.21 1.18 12 28,789
5) Other OECD 0.38 13,800 4.07 -0.63 3.44 40 19,328
Australia 0.48 27,100 1.82 -0.28 1.54 16 31,553
Canada 0.49 28,500 1.66 -0.26 1.40 15 32,777
Iceland 0.56 29,000 0.20 -0.03 0.17 2 29,518
Korea 0.46 16,000 2.15 -0.33 1.82 20 19,140
Mexico 0.33 8,469 5.78 -0.90 4.88 61 13,644
New_Zealand 0.48 21,300 1.76 -0.27 1.49 16 24,690
Norway 0.50 31,200 1.33 -0.21 1.12 12 34,840
Switzerland 0.57 29,300 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 29,346
Turkey 0.31 6,245 6.41 -0.99 5.42 70 10,585
Current (2002)
Emp/Pop GDP/Cap GDP/CapAnnualized Annualized Annualized GDP/Cap






For females, Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country, will have the largest increases in 
GDP/cap of 58% if it increases its ratio of employment to population for females. Spain, Italy, and 
Ireland, predominantly catholic countries also have potential and could have significant increases in 
their GDP/cap by 17-28% if they increased their labour force to working age for females. The United 
States has one of the lowest demographic dividends of 9% and already has a relatively high ratio of 
labour force to working age for females compared to the other countries. 
 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
 
The data clearly show a short term tradeoff between participation and productivity, although there 
notable exceptions. In the regressions we generally found that the coefficients on the participation 
variable where far less than 1.0 in absolute value and declining over time. This suggests that a 1% 
increase in participation typically is not offset by productivity in the sense that it reduces per capita 
income. This finding was supported by earlier studies, e.g. Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) and 
Cette (2004) as well as other studies referred to in the literature review. That is annual productivity 
growth is explained by a number of factors such as ICT investment and then participation is included.  
 
However, as earlier studies only look at the one-year effects, our study also shows that the 
trade-off effects peter out relatively rapidly, i.e., after about 5 years. In addition we also used the 
panel structure described earlier to estimate the effect of participation on per capita income directly. 
The results generally show a positive a significant improvement in per capita income, even in the 
short run. 
 
Increased participation is likely to bring in elements of the potential labour pool that have 
different characteristics than those in the working part of the population. The diversity of new entrants 
to the workforce in terms of age and gender and skills, experience and education, as well as their 
labour market status (out of the workforce, unemployed, and length of time in each category) are all 
important characteristics that effect the productivity–participation tradeoff. 
 
Participation rates for each group of potential workers depend on incentives, culture and 
institutions, with incentives and institutions of particular importance to direct policy initiatives. These 
factors vary by country and over time and can be grouped into three major categories: 
• Demographic factors that determine the potential working age population, and its 
distribution in terms of age and gender; 
• Economic factors that determine the supply of labour, in particular the labour force 
participation rate, number of hours per worker and investments in skills;  
• Economic factors that determine the demand for labour, such as the sectorial structure 
of the economy, the “state of technology”, and the distribution by skills.  
 
The first group is mainly influenced by demographic developments, including the age 
pyramid and (to a more limited extent) immigration. These factors will differ by country. The second 
set of factors depends mainly on the (net after taxes) remuneration (compared to the availability of 
remuneration for non-working alternatives) of the various categories in the labour force (age, gender, 
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skill level) and (to a more limited extent) on some external conditions such as facilities for child care, 
family structure, etc. The third group includes things like the pace of technological progress (for 
example, the availability of ICT in producing and using sectors of the economy), production 
possibilities and possible coordinated and government enforced agreements on (gross) remuneration, 
and the comparative advantages of an economy expressed in its industrial structure. 
  
While many European countries currently have relatively high productivity levels relative to 
the U.S., supported by low participation rates and high skill levels among those working, an important 
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